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:

Case No. 920705-CA

Defendants and Appellants.)
Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
plaintiff petitions the court for an order allowing rehearing of
the court decision filed by the court on November 10, 1994.
Plaintiff's

counsel

hereby

certifies

that

this

Petition

for

Rehearing is brought in good faith and not to cause delay.

The

Petition for Rehearing is made because it appears that the court
overlooked

or

misunderstood

facts

in

issuing

its

opinion,

particularly pertaining to the issue of the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff brought this action as the assignee of the New
Empire Group consisting of Myron B. Child, Jr., Ronald S. Cook, Ray
W. Lamoreaux, Wendell
Company.

P. Hansen, and New Empire Development

(Opinion, footnote 2) The New Empire Group had a written
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contract with Alpine, and the rights under that contract had been
assigned to McKean.

Defendant Alpine received $330,000 from

Richard McKean acting on behalf of New Empire, but neither McKean
nor Alpine received a conveyance of land required by the contract
terms.

The trial court found that Alpine wrongly refused to

release the property in question, which determination was not
challenged on appeal.

(Opinion, footnote 8)

When the bankruptcy

court disposed of the land, McKean's contractual right to specific
performance was abrogated.

Therefore, plaintiff, as assignee of

the New Empire Group, brought this action to recover damages.
A

number

of different

against the property.

parties

claimed

encumbrances

One of the New Empire Group members (Child)

filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1982 claiming an interest in the
subject land, thus preventing conveyance by Alpine of the land to
the New Empire Group and staying any action by creditors, including
McKean. On February 28, 1985, defendant Alpine purchased the land
from

the

bankruptcy

trustee

free

and

clear

of

liens

and

encumbrances other than the encumbrances senior to Alpine which
they assumed in their purchase bid. Until disposition of the land
by the bankruptcy trustee's sale, plaintiff's only remedy under the
contract was for specific performance to seek recovery of the land.
The alternative remedy of seeking damages under the equitable
principle of an implied contract did not accrue or become available
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to plaintiff until the bankruptcy sale in February 1985.
The court on page 5 of its opinion finds that the statute
of limitations on the written contract would have begun to run
sometime between June 25, 1979, and July 3, 1980.

Plaintiff's

action was brought June 25, 1985, which was within the six year
period which Utah Code Annotated 78-12-23 allows to bring an action
"upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an
instrument in writing...."
This court found that if plaintiff had prayed for
specific performance of the Alpine contract, the 6 year statute of
limitations would apply.

As long as specific performance was an

appropriate remedy, it was the only remedy afforded under the
written contract.

The New Empire Group or McKean as assignor did

not have an option to bring an action in equity or for dollar
damages while the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the
subject property. The parties stipulated that upon the sale of the
land on February 28, 1985, by the bankruptcy court the ability to
seek specific performance terminated.

(Opinion, footnote 10)

Plaintiff had claimed that the action was "founded" on the original
written contract.

This court held that rights under the written

contract had terminated, and therefore McKean1s cause of action was
one of implied contract in equity.

If it is to be construed that

the action is one of implied contract, then the four year statute
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of limitations could only begin to run when the cause of action
arose on February 28, 1985. Plaintiff believes the court erred in
not construing the action as one "founded" on the written contract.
However, even if the action is of implied contract, the statute had
not expired for the reasons outlined below.
THE COURT'S RULING AS TO THE TOLLING EFFECT OF
BANKRUPTCY IS IN ERROR AND SHOULD BE RE-EXAMINED
The right to bring an action for specific performance was
stayed by the bankruptcy filed by Myron Child on February 25, 1982,
because of his claim to an ownership interest in the property. The
exact nature

of that

interest never was adjudicated

in the

bankruptcy court because the land was sold for less than the sum
necessary to pay off priority encumbrances.

The automatic stay

provided under 11 U.S.C. 3 62 prevented any action affecting the
property.

It was not until February 28, 1985, when the bankruptcy

trustee sold the property to defendant Alpine free L i clear of
liens that McKean as assignee of the New Empire Group lost his
contractual right of specific performance.

Thereafter he had an

equitable cause of action seeking damages as his remedy.
The

right

of

specific

performance

was

stayed

from

February 25, 1982, through at least February 28, 1985, when the
property was sold.

As to any action involving Myron Child, the

tolling time of an action affecting his interests would continue
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until his bankruptcy dismissal, but that action does not appeal
necessary to consider
tolling

effect

Until at least February 28, 1985, the

of U.C.A.

78-12-41

applied,

whnli

provides

as

follows:
When the commencement of an action is stayed
by injunction or a statutory prohibition the
time of the continuance of the injunction or
prohibition is not part of the time limited
for the commencement of the action.
The court's opinion addresses the tolling effect of the bankruptcy
as it affects the bankruptcy trustee,

Kii+

- overlooks the tolling

effect on the New Empire Group members (and McKean) who were not
the petitioners

in bankruptcy,

The

bankruptcy

code reference

relied on by the court governs only the bankruptcy stay as it
applies to I \w truuteu for the debtor and not to other creditors.
The positions of McKean and New Empire were adverse to the tin istee.
They were clearly creditors and had no common identity with the
trustee.

Nevertheless, they were prevented for over three years

from seeking recovery of the real property.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the tolling effect of
bankruptcy proceedings in the case of Citicorp Mortgage v. Hardy,
834 P.2d

554

(Utah 1992).

That case discusses the statute of

limitations applicable to seeking a deficiency judgment after a
trust deed foreclosure.

The debtor filed a bankruptcy to avoid a

trust deed foreclosure.

The bankruptcy court allowed the trust
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deed foreclosure to proceed•

The debtor's bankruptcy was then

dismissed without discharge (as was the bankrupt debtor in the case
at bar).

Even though the statute of limitations would have

normally expired on seeking a deficiency judgment, the court held
that the bankruptcy tolled the statut
action to proceed.

and allowed the deficiency

The court acknowledged that creditors are

precluded from instituting any action detrimental to the bankruptcy
estate prior to termination of expiration of the stay.

The court

reversed the lower court's dismissal of the case and stated:
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-41 bears directly upon
the issue presented, and its substance is
wholly consistent with like provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.
In similar plain and
unequivocal language, the statute provides,
"When the commencement of an action is stayed
by injunction or a statutory prohibition the
time of the continuance or prohibition is not
part of the time limited for the commenc€iment
of the action."
Thus, under both the
Bankruptcy
Code
and
our
own statute,
plaintiff's deficiency action was timely
filed.
In regard to the public policy considerations
advanced by plaintiff, the foregoing analysis
of the applicable statutory provisions has the
effect of alleviating the potential for
abusive filings of bankruptcy proceedings to
defeat legitimate deficiency actions on
statute of limitations grounds.
In the case at bar, to allow bankruptcy proceedings to interfere
with the recovery of land until it is too late to bring an action
in equity would be manifestly unjust and contrary to the clear
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mandate of the Utah Supreme Court.
THE COURT APPEARS TO HAVE ERRED IN DETERMINING THE DATE
FOR COMMENCEMENT OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN AN
EQUITABLE ACTION OF IMPLIED CONTRACT
Until their rights against the land were extinguished,
the New Empire Group (McKean) could not have brought an action to
recover damages.
damages.

The contract did not provide for a remedy of

The contract only provided for a remedy of conveyance of

the property.

Therefore, plaintiff had no remedy in equity or for

damages until the land was sold on February 28, 1985, by the
bankruptcy court free and clear of liens.
After the bankruptcy court sold the land, plaintiff's
remedy changed.

Since McKean's cause of action for specific

performance was lost, his remedy became a remedy for damages or
equity implied in the written contract.

If plaintiff's cause of

action is not considered to be founded on New Empire's written
contract, then it was not until plaintiff's encumbrance against the
land was lost in February 1985 that plaintiff could sue in equity
to recover damages.
The court's opinion rests partially on the 1937 case of
Brown v. Cleverly, 70 P.2d 881 (Utah 1937).

The Brown case is

readily distinguishable because the plaintiff had brought an action
to nullify a written contract and received a dollar judgment.
Thereafter the Cleverlys filed bankruptcy and the court discharged
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the judgment in bankruptcy.

The Browns brought a new action

seeking equitable remedies. The court found that it had been more
than 4 years after suit was filed on the initial action and
therefore an action in equity was barred by the staute of
limitations.
In the Brown case, the action on the breach of the
written contract was commenced on May 28, 1931, and tried on the
merits.

No appeal was filed and the judgment became final.

On

August 15, 1935, Browns brought an action seeking an equitable lien
on real property and provided a means of foreclosing the same.
This was more than four years after the original action and the
court did not allow the equitable remedy to be pled on an action
previously tried on the merits.

The court found that it was more

than four years after the commencement of the initial action before
the plaintiff

first sought to impress a lien upon the real

property.1
It is noteworthy that the court considered the statute of
limitations running from the time of the filing of the May 28,
1931, action to terminate the contract.
1

The Brown court seems to

The initial Brown v. Cleverly action was upon a written
contract and was fully adjudicated on he merits. The second
action was an equitable action to imj -ss a lien on property.
Since the action on the written contract had been fully
adjudicated, a new action under equity not founded upon a written
contract had to be filed separately to avoid principles of res
judicata.
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hold that the statute of limitations commenced running when the
rights under the written contract were terminated.
A significant question before this court that has not
been addressed is whether McKean's equitable action should arise at
the time of the breach of the written contract or at the time that
the right to recover the land under the written contract is lost
and the equitable action arises.
Implied assumpsit is a principle of equity normally
applied when there are no written documents upon which to interpret
contractual terms.

In this case there was no right for the

equitable relief until plaintiff's right to recover land under the
written contract was terminated by the trustee's sale of the land.
It is not logical that a four year statute of limitations could
expire before the right to sue for specific performance under the
six year statute of limitations could even occur.
While the court should not ignore the plain meaning of a
statute, a statute of limitations should be liberally construed to
effect the objects of the statute and to promote justice.

U.C.A.

68-3-2 When any doubt exists on the application of the statute of
limitations, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the longer
rather than the shorter period.

Hardinae Co. v. Eimco Corp.. 266

P.2d 494 (Utah 1954); Juab County Department of Public Welfare v.
Summersf 426 P.2d 1 (Utah 1967).

In this case, if there is any

doubt as to whether the cause of action applies under a six year
statute of limitations, a tolled four year statute, or a new cause
of action commencing in 1985, that doubt should be resolved in
plaintiff's favor.
In the case of Davidson

Lumber Sales v

Bonneville

Investment, Inc., 794 P.2d 11 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court
addressed the issue of the commencement date of the statute of
limitations under a contract implied in law.

This arose out of a

personal injury case resulting from a defective product.

After

settling the personal injury suit, the seller filed suit against
the manufacturer to recoup the damages paid to settle the first
suit.

The court held that the action against the manufacturer was

timely brought even though it was more than four years after the
injury occurred or the product was purchased.

The court held:

A common-law indemnity action is based on a
theory of quasi-contract or contract implied
in law and is generally held to be governed by
the statute of limitations applicable to
actions on implied contracts. A common-law
indemnity
action
is, therefore, wholly
distinct from the underlying action which gave
rise to the right of indemnity.
One
commentator has stated:
"An action on an implied contract of
indemnity is wholly irdependent as a cause of
action from the transa. „ion or situation which
gave rise to the right of indemnity. Although
the right to indemnity may arise out of a
tort, the action to enforce the right usually
is not governed by the statute relating to the
tort. Similarly, a right of indemnity which
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arises out of an express contract to pay money
or perform some other act generally is not
governed by the statute of limitations
applicable to an action upon an express
contract, where such statute is distinct from
the statute governing actions upon implied
contracts."
Annotation, What Statute of Limitations Covers
Action for Indemnity, 57 A.L.R.3d 833, § 3
(1974) .
* * *

A common-law indemnity action does not arise
when the underlying damage occurs; rather, it
runs from the time of the payment of the
underlying claim or the payment of a judgment
or a settlement.
See Perry v. Pioneer
Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah
1984) ; Annotation, When Statute of Limitations
Commences to Run Against Claim for a
Contribution or Indemnity Based on Tort. 57
A.L.R.3d 867, § 3[a] (1974).
The cause of action under

implied contract

in the

Davidson case did not arise until all of the economics of the cause
of action came into being.

Likewise, the cause of action in the

case at bar did not arise until the right to recover the real
property was lost by the trustee's sale on February 28, 1985, and
the plaintiff thereafter had an equitable action to recover an
implied remedy.
In Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 214
(Utah 1984) the court held that in an action arising under an
implied contract, "the statute of limitations on an indemnity
action does not begin to run until the cause of action accrues,
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even though the statute of limitations on the underlying action may
already have run." See also Salt Lake City Corp, v. Kasler Corp.f
842 F.Supp. 1380 (D.Utah 1994)
In the case at bar, the statute of limitations of the
separate cause of action for damages under an implied contract
could not have arisen until February 28, 1985, when the real
property was sold and the rights of specific performance were
terminated.
SHOULD THE CASE HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS MOOT
As a secondary issue, the court held that the defendants1
appeal was not "moot" (Opinion, footnote 6).

The court relied in

part on the case of West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co. . 818 P.2d
1311, 1316 (Utah App. 1991).

That case held that when a party

satisfies a judgment at a lower level it does not make the issue
moot or waive the right of appeal "when the right of appeal has
been specifically reserved by stipulation between adverse parties."
The West Valley City case needs to be distinguished from the case
at bar.

It only involved a partial satisfaction of judgment and

the stipulation was between the adverse parties.
In that case the adversarial parties stipulated that
neither party waived any right of appeal.

In the case at bar, a

total satisfaction of judgment was filed by parties who were
business partners of the defendants who had acquired an interest in
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the judgment through an execution sale.

The defendants entered

into the stipulation which allowed a continuation of an appeal.
However, neither McKean nor his attorney were parties to that
stipulation. The parties to the stipulation were working together
for their mutual benefit to avoid payment of attorney's fees.
McKean's attorney had a vital interest in the protection of his
attorney's lien and was not informed of the stipulation or made a
party to it.

In effect, the defendants were the buyers of their

own judgment and continued the appeal solely to avoid paying the
attorney's lien.
The case at bar is more closely related to Jacobsen,
Morrin & Robbins Construction Company v. St. Joseph High School.
794 P.2d 505 (Utah App. 1990) . Also significant is the very recent
Utah Supreme ruling on September 14, 1994, John H. Klas v. Van
Wagoner, Sup. Ct. Case No. 930504 (unpublished but attached). The
court dismissed an appeal as moot because a total satisfaction of
judgment had been entered by the lower court even though the lower
court had authorized the appellant to pay the judgment and continue
the appeal.

It would be appropriate for the court to review its

decision as to the mootness of the appeal.
SUMMARY
Plaintiff requests the court for a rehearing for the
following reasons:
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1. The court appears to have misunderstood the facts as
they relate to the tolling effect of the bankruptcy preventing
McKean or the New Empire Group from pursuing their remedy of
specific performance.

Plaintiff requests the court to reconsider

its opinion as to the tolling effect against the New Empire Group
(McKean) pursuing its action against Alpine.
2. The Court's decision appears to be in error as to the
effective date in which the statute of limitations commences on a
claim under "implied assumpsit" or implied contract.
3. The court appears to have been in error in addressing
what constitutes a cause of action "founded" upon a written
contract.
4. The court's appears to have not fully understood the
facts regarding the filing of a full satisfaction of judgment and
is requested to reconsider the question of whether the appeal was
moot.
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the court allow a
rehearing of this matter for the reasons stated.
DATED this ~2si~- day of November 1994.
Respectfully submitted,

RALPH R. TATE, JR.
Attorney for Plaintiff

^

23JT THB SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OP UTAH

J o h n H- K l a s ,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l e e ,
v.
Mar3c O* Van Wagoner and
K a t h r y n Van Wagoner,
D e f e n d a n t s and A p p e l l a n t s .

No. 930504
880903192

ORDER

This case is moot and is therefore dismissed.

FOR THE CODRT

%A^—
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J2*Z-

>Mffehaa£''D. Zistmerman
Chief J u s t i c e
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NOTICE OF MAILING
I mailed £t—copy* of the foregoing Memorandum, postage
prepaid, this ^ — day of November 1994, addressed as follows:
R. Stephen Marshall
Jeremy M. Hoffman
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